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POllCE LIABIUTY IN fiGH-SPEED CHASES: FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION OR STATE TORT LAW; WHY THE 
SUPREME COURT'S NEW STANDARD LEAVES THE 
BURDEN ON THE STATE AND WHAT TIDS MIGHT 
MEAN FOR MARYLAND 
Law and disorder on the interstate; Chase: At speeds hitting 
110 m.p.h., police pursue a carload of bank holdup suspects 
from Baltimore, only to lose it in Silver Spring. . .. By the 
time police lost the car at the Colesville Road exit in Silver 
Spring, officers from eight jurisdictions driving everything 
from Ford Crown Victorias to Geo Trackers had joined the 
chase. The pursuit "involved anybody and everybody," said 
Special Agent Peter A. Gulotta, Jr. of the FBI. Police said 
they were amazed that no one was injured and nobody 
crashed.' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Newspaper headlines make it quite clear; high-speed police 
chases are a regular occurrence across the nation.2 The necessity 
1. Peter Hermann et ai., Law and Disorder on the Interstate, THE SUN (BALT.), Sept. 
19, 1998, at lA, available in 1998 WL 4985502. 
2. In a small study, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported 
that in 1996 there were 108 deaths involving police vehicles. Of the 108 
deaths, 18 were police officers, 75 were uninvolved motorists, and 15 were 
uninvolved pedestrians. A similar 1997 study reported a total of 104 deaths in-
volving police vehicles. Of the 104 deaths, 25 were police officers, 54 were 
uninvolved motorists, and 24 were uninvolved pedestrians. See National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration, Motor Vehicle Crash Data from FARS and GES 
(visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/www/co&selcity 
id=o&disp_col=l&showzero=n7>; see also Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot 
Pursuit: Toward a Categorical Approach, 73 IND. LJ. 1277, 1279-80 (1998) ("In-
deed the motor vehicle has been determined to be the deadliest weapon in 
the police arsenal, surpassing even firearms." (citing Geoffrey P. Alpert & Pat-
rick R. Anderson, The Most Deadly Pursuits: Police Pursuits, 3 JUST. Q. 1, 2 
(1986». While the numbers of this small study may seem very undaunting, it 
only includes deaths and not the larger number of accidents that ended in in-
jury. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et ai., The Constitutional Implications of High-Speed Po-
lice Pursuits Under A Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward Through the Haze, 
27 U. MEM. L. REv. 599, 600 (1997) (noting that "the number of deaths result-
ing from high-speed pursuits far exceeds the number of deaths caused each 
139 
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and effectiveness of police pursuits in modern law enforcement 
practice have been the center of vigorous debate3 at the court-
houses and in legislative offices on both the state and federal 
levels.4 The main issue underlying this debate is the liability of po-
lice officers, including the localities that employ them, for injuries 
to both suspects and bystanders resulting from a high-speed police 
year by any other police activity") [hereinafter Alpert et aI., Constitutional Im-
plications]. According to one study, 45% of high-speed pursuits result in prop-
erty damage and 23% cause personal injury. See Phillip M. Pickus, Torts - G0v-
ernment Immunity - Police Officer Owes Duty of Care to Third Parties Injured by the 
Fleeing Suspect; Injured Plaintiff Can Recover From State and Political Subdivisions If 
Officer Was Negligent in Commencing and Maintaining Pursuit. Boyer v. State, 323 
Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991), 21 u. BALT. L. REv. 363, 363 n.l (1992) (citing 
Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of 
Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 528 (1989». Furthermore, 
the economic costs of traffic crashes are very high-an average of $150 billion 
a year. See Lawrence Blincoe, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, The Economic Cost of 
Motor Vehicle Crashes (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ 
economic/ecomveI994.htm7>. Given the substantial economic and societal 
costs of high-speed police chases, many commentators question the value of 
benefits from such pursuits. "Most research and professional literature con-
cludes that pursuits create far greater risks than benefits to law enforcement 
and to the public. In other words, the risk created by vehicular pursuits is 
often greater than the need to enforce the law." Alpert et aI., Constitutional 
Implications, at 606 (citing Maurice Hannigan, The Viability of Police Pursuits, 59 
PoueE CHIEF 46, 48-49 (1992». These trends can be found in Maryland as 
well. For example, a six-year study of the Baltimore County police department 
reported 1064 pursuits, from which 388 accidents occurred. See Alpert et aI., 
Constitutional Implications, at 612. This amounted to one accident for every 2.7 
pursuits. See id. The reasons for these pursuits included traffic offenses (55%), 
suspected felonious activity (25%), and reckless or impaired driving (6%). See 
id. (citing Thomas Lucadamo, Identifying the Dimension of Police Pursuit 
(1984) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland) (on file with Geof-
frey Alpert, Andrew C. Clarke, and William C. Smith». 
3. See Dennis J. Kenney & Geoffrey P. Alpert, A National Survey of Pursuits and the 
Use of Police Force: Data from Law Enforcement Agencies, 25(4) J. CRIM. JUST. 315, 
315-23 (1997); see also Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 
604-05. See generally Alpert & Dunham, supra note 2, at 531 (analyzing the rela-
tionship between various factors, such as officer's age, duration of chase, num-
ber of officers involved, the officer's gender, and the injuries that are in-
curred as a result of a high-speed chase). 
4. See, e.g., Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 604 ("The 
United States Congress, several local grand juries, and many other govern-
ment entities have conducted investigations into the problems associated with 
police pursuits. This inquiry has led to reform in policies, training, and super-
vision of pursuit driving." (citations omitted». 
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chase.5 
In the federal courts, this debate resulted in a split among the 
circuits as to what, if any, constitutional rights are afforded to a 
party recovering from injuries resulting from a high-speed chase,6 
and what legal standard should be applied to determine when a po-
lice officer is liable for those injuries.7 The Supreme Court recently 
clarified whether the Constitution protects an individual injured 
during a high-speed pursuit and delineated the proper standard for 
police liability to be applied in police pursuit cases.8 While the Su-
preme Court has spoken, there is still considerable room for the 
states, depending on their particular political and social climates, to 
fashion their own tort remedies as they see fit. 9 
5. Cf County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (stating the issue 
as "whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee 
of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless in-
difference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a 
suspected offender"); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1299-1302 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (determining the standard for liability when a vehicle 
that was not involved with the chase was hit by a vehicle driven by the fleeing 
suspect); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-18 (4th Cir. 
1991) (inquiring into the liability of a police officer where an innocent driver 
was struck by both the vehicle of the fleeing suspect and the police officer 
pursuing him). See generally Roger W. Kirst, Constitutional Rights of Bystanders in 
the War on Crime, 28 N.M. L. REv. 59, 68-77 (1998) (discussing the need for 
constitutional protection for bystanders injured during the course of a high-
speed chase); Mitchell J. Edlund, Note, In the Heat of the Chase: Determining 
Substantive Due Process Violations Within the Framework of Police Pursuits When an 
Innocent Bystander is Injured, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 161, 162-68 (1995) (suggesting 
a lower level of culpability for injured bystanders under substantive due pro-
cess). 
6. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
7. See discussion infra Part III.C; see also, e.g., Alpert et al., Constitutional Implica-
tions, supra note 2? at 626-61 (discussing the various pre-Lewis approaches 
taken by the circuits and commenting, "[b]ecause the 'shocks the conscience' 
standard is an incoherent and unattainable standard for both litigants and 
courts, the Authors conclude that in high-speed pursuit cases under a substan-
tive due process analysis, courts should apply the clearer and more concise 
'deliberate and reckless indifference' standard"). 
8. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-56. For a detailed discussion of Lewis, see infra Part 
II.D. 
9. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 (stating that the constitutional concept of "con-
science-shocking" duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, but 
points either clearly away from liability or toward liability at the end of the 
tort law spectrum). Federal courts are reluctant to constitutionalize state tort 
law. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1041 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996). One commenta-
tor has suggested that, "[a]lthough plaintiffs have been somewhat successful 
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This Comment sets forth the various considerations an attorney 
must account for when analyzing issues of police liability arising out 
of a high-speed chase.lO Through the framework that is developed 
by this Comment, an attorney will be better equipped to make the 
early tactical decisions that can determine the outcome of a case. 
Part II of this Comment examines the debate over liability for po-
lice actions, including the policy considerations and actors fre-
quently involved. II Part III of this Comment will address the applica-
ble federal statutory and constitutional provisions and provide 
relevant case law for each. 12 Part IV will discuss the applicable Mary-
land law and examine its importance in obtaining recovery for a cli-
ent injured during a high-speed police chase. 13 Finally, Part V navi-
gates the web of Maryland law, suggesting areas of possible police 
liability that better balances individual compensation with law en-
forcement's need to ensure the safety of the public. 14 Notwithstand-
ing a high bar to recovery for plaintiffs injured during high-speed 
police pursuits, this Comment concludes that state law should be 
considered a viable avenue of recovery to serve both the interests of 
the state and of the injured parties. 15 
II. THE INTERESTS AND POLICIES IMPLICATED BY THE DE-
BATE OVER LIABILITY FOR A POLICE OFFICER'S ACTIONS 
The debate surrounding the potential liability of officers, police 
departments, and municipalities to individuals who are injured 16 as 
in litigating pursuit claims on negligence grounds, judicial hostility to consti-
tutional claims [still] runs high." Michael Avery, Police Chases: More Deadly 
Than a Speeding Bullet?, 33 TRIAL 52, 53 (Dec. 1997). 
10. See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 58-150 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
16. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836-37 (1998) (injured sus-
pect); Boveri v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (injured driver 
of an uninvolved vehicle); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(injured pedestrian); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996) (in-
jured driver of uninvolved vehicle); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 
1300 (3d Cir. 1994) (injured suspects and bystanders); Webber v. Mefford, 43 
F.3d 1340, 1342 (10th Cir. 1994) (injured bystanders); Medina v. City of Den-
ver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992) (injured bicyclist); Temkin v. Freder-
ick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-18 (4th Cir. 1991) (injured driver of 
uninvolved vehicle); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir. 1987) (in-
jured driver of uninvolved vehicle); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 948 (11th 
1999] Police Liability in High-Speed Chases 143 
a result of a high-speed chase invariably invokes competing interests 
and policies. 17 A police officer can incur liabilityl8 either by inten-
tionally stopping a fleeing suspectl9 or by maintaining a pursuit that 
ends in an accident.20 Bystanders are frequently injured during a 
police officer's pursuit of a fleeing suspect21 when their automobiles 
collide with either the officer's or the suspect's automobile, or when 
they are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, also increas-
ing the potential liability at issue. 22 
A. Competing Policies and Standards 
The debate over the potential liability of police officers, police 
departments, and municipalities bears significant policy considera-
tions to be addressed and eventually balanced.23 The competing pol-
Cir. 1986) (injured driver of uninvolved vehicle); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 
534, 535 (5th Cir. 1985) (i~ured suspect); Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 
1320, 1321-22 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (injured suspect); Britt v. Little Rock Police 
Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (injured driver of uninvolved ve-
hicle). 
17. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the International As-
sociation of Chiefs of Police define qpolice pursuit" as an event that is initi-
ated when a law enforcement officer, operating an authorized emergency ve-
hicle, gives notice to stop (either through the use of visual or audible 
emergency signals or a combination of emergency devices) to a motorist who 
the officer is attempting to apprehend, and the motorist fails to comply with 
the signal by either maintaining his or her speed, increasing speed, or taking 
other evasive action to elude the officer's continued attempts to stop the mo-
torist. See Traffic Law Enforcement Planner, Pursuit Policy (visited Sept. 5, 
1999) <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov /people/ outreach/safesobr / 16qp/pur-
suit.html>. 
18. It should be noted that the police officer may incur liability personally or in 
an official capacity. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra Part I1I.B.1. 
20. See infra Part III.B.2. 
21. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
22. See generally Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-19 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (discussing police liability where an innocent driver was severely in-
jured when hit by the vehicles of the suspect and the officer in pursuit); Jef-
frey M. Epstein, Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act for Injuries Sustained 
During Police Pursuits, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 356, 36().61 (1994) (analyzing by-
stander injury cases); Mark A. Mesler II, Note, When an Innocent Bystander Who 
is Injured l7y a Police Officer Can Recover Under Section 1983, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 
781, 794-800 (1995) (examining cases where innocent bystanders have been 
injured). 
23. See Alpert et ai., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 602 ("On the one 
hand, if many restrictions are placed on police use of deadly force, the public 
may be endangered because dangerous persons will escape immediate appre-
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icy considerations discussed herein tend to arise in tandem with 
concerns over police practices that pose a risk to the public.24 Given 
the dangers posed by high-speed chases, especially through heavily 
populated areas, the appropriate amount of deference to police dis-
cretion becomes the central issue around which the debate swirlS.25 
For analytical convenience, there are two key public policy perspec-
tives to consider-pro-police and public safety. 
1. Pro-Police 
The major policy concern undermining the argument to in-
crease police liability is the fear of hampering effective law enforce-
ment.26 Particularly in times of high crime rates and societal disgust 
with criminal activity,27 there is an enormous fear that imposing too 
much liability on law enforcement officials will have a severe chil-
ling effect on successful law enforcement efforts. 28 There is a belief 
that once the police officer must consider the possible civil conse-
quences of a hot pursuit, wrongdoers will gain an undesirable in-
centive to flee. 29 
The pro-police perspective is a natural outgrowth of the com-
mon-law doctrine of governmental immunity.30 Governmental immu-
hension. Alternatively, insufficient control of the use of deadly force may re-
sult in needless killings in a community."). 
24. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 533 U.S. 833, 853 (1998). In discussing the 
police officer's decision-making process, the Court recognizes the balance be-
tween the need to stop a suspect, and the need to protect the public from a 
high-speed threat. See id. See generally Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, 
supra note 2, at 604-06 (discussing police pursuits and reform measures). 
25. See Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 606. 
26. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (1st Cir. 1996). The court stressed 
that a finding of liability would "hamstring the police in their performance of 
vital duties." !d. at 1038. Not eager for such a result, the court declined to ju-
dicially promulgate law enforcement decisions; this would simply create too 
much interference. See id.; see also Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th 
Cir. 1995) ("Holding police officers liable for every injurious consequence of 
their actions would paralyze the functions of law enforcement."). 
27. In recent years, the national violent crime rate has actually declined. See, e.g., 
Crime at Lowest in Decades, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at All, availabk in 1998 
WL 22543569. 
28. See Evans, 100 F.3d at 1037-38. The Evans court observed that police chases are 
"a necessary concomitant of maintaining order in our modern society." Id. 
29. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
30. See Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 
A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979) ("[The doctrine of governmental immunity] is pres-
ently viewed as a rule of policy which protects the State from burdensome in-
terference with its governmental functions and preserves its control over State 
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nity is based on the premise that the State must be protected from 
litigants or be severely hindered in its governmental functions.3! 
This belief resonates even today.32 Unless the Maryland General As-
sembly statutorily creates an exception to governmental immunity, 
the State shall escape liability.33 While some legislative enactments 
may chip away the protection of governmental immunity, the pro-
police policy perspective is often served, in that statutes often limit 
the damages that can be awarded and prevent litigants from fully 
accessing the pockets of the State.34 While this type of legislation 
waives the State's immunity in limited situations, it still fosters a pro-
police policy by preserving the ability of police officers to perform 
their day-to-day functions without fear of personal liability.35 
agencies and funds." (citing Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 
256 Md. 326, 333, 260 A.2d 295, 298-99 (1970); Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 
267,271, 195 A. 571, 573-74 (1937); State v. Wingert, 132 Md. 605, 611, 104 A. 
117, 119-20 (1918); State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 34 Md. 344 (1871), 
aff'd, 88 U.S. 456 (1875»). 
31. See id.; see also Godwin, 256 Md. at 332, 260 A.2d at 298 ("The immunity is said 
to rest upon public policy; ... reluctance to divert public funds to compen-
sate private injuries; and the inconvenience and embarrassment which would 
descend upon the government if it should be subject to such liability."). 
32. See Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 55,405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979); see 
also Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555, 565, 605 A.2d 620, 625 
(1992) ("The Court concluded that to take the protection of governmental 
immunity away from the municipality would have a chilling effect on the mu-
nicipality's willingness to provide this most vital and substantial public ser-
vice." (discussing Mayor of Baltimore City v. State ex rel. Blueford, 173 Md. 
267,273, 195 A.2d 571, 574-75 (1937»). Specifically in regard to § 1983, lim-
ited immunity may protect an officer against the threat of individual recovery; 
as explained by one writer: "Under qualified immunity, state and local offi-
cials who perform their executive and administrative functions without violat-
ing clearly established laws are protected against § 1983 monetary liability in 
their personal capacities." Edlund, supra note 5, at 177 (citing Buckley v. Fitz-
simmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Harlow v. Fitzsimmons, 457 U.S. 800, 807 
(1982); Butz v. Economou, 38 U.S. 478, 508 (1978». 
33. See Austin, 286 Md. at 55, 405 A.2d at 257. 
34. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
35. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b) (1998) ("State personnel are 
immune from suit in courts of this State and from liability in tort for a tor-
tious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State 
personnel .... "). For a further discussion of governmental immunity, see in-
fra notes 151-60 and accompanying text. 
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2. Public Safety 
Contrary to the pro-police perspective lies the belief that too 
much discretion afforded to police officers with lower risk of liabil-
ity creates an overwhelming threat to the safety of the general pub-
lic.36 This idea is based on the notion that effective law enforcement 
need not entail high-speed chases that place the general public's 
lives and liberties at riskY While the law must protect public coffers 
and the ability of governmental actors to efficiently do their job, it 
must also afford an avenue of resolution for dispute and collection 
of damages. 38 Notwithstanding the policy argument that a state must 
protect itself from excessive litigation, the acts of its agents may 
nonetheless result in injuries to a constituent it has avowed to pro-
tect. 39 This shortcoming is especially exacerbated when individuals 
from outside the state are injured by a government agent, represen-
tative, or employee working within another state.40 In such a scena-
rio, not even the democratic forces can protect this individual's in-
terests.41 Therefore, from a public safety perspective, governmental 
immunity leaves governmental actors with essentially unfettered dis-
cretion, promoting unreasonable behavior and leaving the actors 
without any fear of the possible repercussions from their daily 
decisions. 
Generally, both sides of the coin come into play in any police 
36. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 865 (1998) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); see also Joseph Finarelli, Feature, High-speed Chases and Section 1983: Why 
a Definitive Liability Standard May Not Matter, 66 DEF. COUNSEL j. 238, 246 
(1999) ("Certain risks of potential harm inhere in driving streets and high-
ways. In police pursuits, high-speeds, aggressive driving, and the obsession 
with escape or apprehension to the exclusion of concern for others all 
heighten the basic risks. This combination is a potentially lethal cocktail."). 
37. See Tim Crimmond, Police Pursuits: Traveling a Collision Course, POUCE CHIEF, 
July 1993, at 43, 47. This inconsistency is especially glaring because it is the 
authority of a democratic government that the police officer is exercising 
when injuring a suspect or innocent bystander. See Edlund, supra note 5, at 
217 (advocating the adoption of the "deliberate indifference" standard and 
reasoning that deliberately indifferent "pursuits entail an abuse of police pow-
ers that are uniquely bestowed upon a police officer and which entail grave 
risks when exercised"). 
38. See Austin, 286 Md. at 81-83, 405 A.2d at 272 (Cole, j., dissenting) (urging Ma-
ryland to adopt a rule which allows tort recovery from the State). 
39. See id. at 83, 405 A.2d at 272 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
40. See id. at 62, 405 A.2d at 261. 
41. See id. at 78, 405 A.2d at 269 (Cole, J., dissenting) (noting that recovery would 
occur had the State not been a party). 
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pursuit litigation or legislation.42 These broad policy concerns 
should be the underlying theme of any argument for or against po-
lice liability. Yet, to appreciate the interaction of these opposing 
policy considerations, the practitioner must begin with the most 
fundamental questions for claims of recovery: from whom and 
under what causes of action mayan injured plaintiff recover? 
B. The Potential Defendants 
There are two principal defendants who may be implicated by 
injuries resulting from a high-speed chase; one is the actual officer 
involved in the chase, the other is the municipality for whom the 
officer works.43 
1. Police Officer 
When a police officer is acting under color of law, the officer 
can be held liable individually44 if the officer's actions violate a citi-
zen's constitutional rights.45 Likewise, in a state tort action, the of-
42. See also Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 601 (" [The 
topic of liability for high-speed pursuits], like many in the substantive due 
process area, has serious undertones and reflects major policy concerns of 
state and local governments throughout this country."). 
43. See, e.g., Nicole G. Tell, Note, Representing Police Officers and Municipalities: A 
Conflict of Interest For a Municipal Attorney in a § 1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65 
FORDHAM L. REv. 2825, 2830-31 (1997). 
44. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ("Personal capacity suits ... seek to 
impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under 
color of state law. Thus, '[0] n the merits, to establish personal liability ... it 
is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused a 
deprivation of a federal right.'" (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 
166 (1985»). Personal capacity suits can be brought against any governmental 
agent, regardless of whether they work for a state, county, or municipal 
agency. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 537 (1986) 
(addressing a personal capacity suit against local district school board mem-
bers); Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 482 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding a claim 
against various state prison officials in their personal capacities); Chavez v. Illi-
nois State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (analyzing a claim 
against an Illinois state trooper in his personal capacity). 
45. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1998) (litigating a First 
Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983); Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 
U.S. 75, 78 (1997) (Due Process and Equal Protection); Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266, 268 (1994) (substantive due process); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 
U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (Fourth Amendment); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 
U.S. 112, 115 (1988) (First Amendment and Due Process); Monell v. Dep't of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (explaining that before any § 1983 lia-
bility there must be the commission of some constitutional tort); Fagan v. City 
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ficer may be sued personally for injuries incurred while the officer 
is acting in a wanton or recklessly negligent manner.46 
2. Municipality 
If the police officer is not sued individually, but rather sued in 
an official capacity,47 then the city or county that employs the of-
ficer may be liable for any damages.48 In addition to finding the of-
of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating the issue as whether 
there has been a clear constitutional violation committed on the individual in 
custody); Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir. 1992) (ex-
plaining that under § 1983 there must be a well-established violation of a con-
stitutional right). 
46. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
47. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (stating that official-
capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action 
against an entity of which an officer is an agent"). As long as the government 
entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit 
is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. 
See id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55). It is noteworthy that a finding of 
blameworthiness on the part of the government official still plays a pivotal 
role in prosecuting a successful claim against the municipality. See City of Los 
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 797-99 (1986) (per curiam). According to the 
Heller Court: "If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of 
the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might 
have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the 
point." [d. at 799 (emphasis added). 
48. See Monel~ 436 U.S. at 690 (concluding that municipalities and local govern-
ment units are subject to liability under § 1983 if the implementation of their 
policies causes constitutional injury); Edlund, supra note 5, at 172. From a 
practical perspective, the municipality is likely to be the most promising ave-
nue of recovery, in that "most police officers do not have the financial capac-
ity to satisfy a sizeable judgment, ... unless the municipality indemnifies the 
officer." Edlund, supra note 5, at 172 (citing SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND CML LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 1.03 (2d ed. 1986». Yet, neither a 
state nor its governmental officials acting in their official capacities are subject 
to a § 1983 suit for money damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor its officials are "per-
sons" under § 1983); see also Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983: 
Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1503, 1531 
(1999) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment precludes the imposition of 
money damages from a state treasury under federal law). However, they can 
be the subject of a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 
n.lO ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for 
injunctive relief, would be a person under section 1983 because 'official-
capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the 
State.''' (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 
159-60 (1908»). 
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ficer liable, the plaintiff must also show that a citizen's constitu-
tional rights were violated while the officer was acting in accordance 
with a formal policy or custom of the municipality.49 This form of li-
ability is not a respondeat superior theory; rather, the police of-
ficer's actions must be based on policies or customs of the entity.50 
Additionally, the municipality's liability is premised on clearly estab-
lishing the officer's underlying constitutional violation.51 Therefore, 
for any action brought under federal law, a prerequisite to any 
high-speed chase litigation is the identification of the constitutional 
source for the underlying claim.52 
Just as there are several potential defendants, there are multi-
ple sources of potential relief for litigants attempting to recover 
damages incurred as a result of a high-speed police pursuit. Issues 
arising out of a high-speed chase can be litigated under state or fed-
eral law.53 With the recent Supreme Court opinion in County of Sac-
ramento v. Lewis,54 absent egregious, intentional police conduct, a 
49. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783 (1997) ("If the sheriff's ac-
tions constitute county 'policy,' then the county is liable for them."); Collins 
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 n.6 (1992). The Collins Court 
stated that the proper analysis of a § 1983 claim against the municipality re-
quires an inquiry into "(I) whether plaintiffs harm was caused by a constitu-
tional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that viola-
tion." Collins, 503 U.S. at 120. 
50. See Monel~ 436 U.S. at 693-94. The Court stated that: 
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury in-
flicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution 
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers 
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent offi-
cial policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is re-
sponsible under § 1983. 
[d. at 694. In fact, a municipality can be liable only if it acts in some way to 
cause the claimed constitutional violation. See id. 
51. See supra note 45; see also Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 
724 (4th Cir. 1991) (establishing that a claim of inadequate training on the 
part of the municipality as a supervisory authority cannot be made out unless 
the officers were themselves found to have committed a constitutional 
wrong); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) (dismissing claims 
against the Mayor and Chief of Police where there was no showing that the 
individual officers committed a constitutional violation). 
52. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) ("The first step in any [§ 1983] 
claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." (cit-
ing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 
137, 140 (1979»). 
53. See infra Parts II, III. 
54. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
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Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process allegation will faiI.55 
Therefore, the possibility of filing a claim under state law becomes 
an essential alternative.56 While the standards differ among states,57 
this Comment will focus on the laws that would affect litigants and 
practitioners in Maryland courts.58 
III. THE FEDERAL STANDARD 
A. Civil Rights Protection Under § 1983 
When a person injured by the conduct of a government official 
wishes to bring a claim in federal court, the general practice is to 
allege a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.59 Section 1983 creates a 
civil cause of action against persons who violate federal constitu-
55. See id. at 848 n.8. For a discussion of substantive due process actions brought 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 85-150 and accompa-
nying text. 
56. See Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 601 ("Innocent 
third parties, who are injured during high-speed pursuits, may seek recovery 
under either state law or under federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); 
Jensen, supra note 2, at 1282-90 (noting and arguing the inadequacy of both § 
1983 and state law actions to redress an injured bystander's injuries). 
57. Almost all states offer some legislatively enacted tort liability scheme for spe-
cific acts committed by governmental officials in the scope of their employ-
ment. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Arkin, Note, Police Chase the Bad Guys, and Plaintiffs 
Chase the Police: Young v. Woodall and the Standard of Care for Officers in Pursuit, 
75 N.C. L. REv. 2468 (1997) (providing an overview of North Carolina's tort 
law relating to police pursuit). 
58. See infra Part III. 
59. Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission 
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered 
to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Congress enacted § 1983 as a means of enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 351 n.3 (1979) 
(Brennan, j., concurring). 
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tional or statutory rights60 while acting "under color of state law. "61 
The requirement that a person act "under color of state law" has 
been defined as the exercise of power "possessed by virtue of state 
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with 
the authority of state law. "62 
In addition to conduct resulting from action by a government 
officer, the plaintiff seeking recovery under § 1983 must also 
demonstrate a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory 
right.63 Failure to meet the more-specifIc-provision rule64 may result 
60. See Edlund, supra note 5, at 169 ("It is abundantly clear that § 1983 was 
adopted to address the failure of certain states to enforce their own laws with 
an even hand." (citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426 
(1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961}}); Comment, ActionaUility 
of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 
533, 549 (1978). 
61. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 536 U.S. 687, 722 
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia commented that: 
Section 1983 establishes a unique, or at least, distinctive, cause of ac-
tion, in that the legal duty which is the basis for relief is ultimately 
defined not by the c1aim-creating statute itself, but by an extrinsic 
body of law to which the statute refers, namely "federal rights else-
where conferred." 
[d. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 
(1979}). There are three essential sources that provide extensive coverage of § 
1983 and litigating claims involving police officers. See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., 
POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION (3d ed. 1998); 1 SHELDON H. 
NAHMOD, CML RiGHTS AND CML LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION 
1983 (4th ed. 1997); 1-2 ISIDORE SILVER, POLICE CML LIABILITY (1986 rev. ed. 
1999). 
62. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). The "under color of state 
law" requirement of § 1983 has been thought to be essentially akin to the 
Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. See United States v. Price, 
383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 935 (1982) (holding that when the challenged conduct constitutes state 
action, the conduct also constitutes color of state law). 
63. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Dan-
iels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In Parmtt, the Court stated: 
[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the 
two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (I) whether 
the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws 
of the United States. 
[d. at 535; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) 
("As in any action under section 1983, the first step is to identify the exact 
contours of the underlying right said to have been violated." (citing Graham 
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in the quick dismissal of any § 1983 claim based purely on substan-
tive due process.65 Obviously, this outcome is not desirable. How-
ever, before County of Sacramento v. LewiS,66 plaintiffs struggled with 
the question of what constitutional right enabled injured parties to 
recover for injuries sustained during a high-speed chase. In police 
pursuit litigation, a claim arises under one of two principal constitu-
tional provisions: (1) the Fourth Amendment as a seizure;67 or (2) 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a claim under the more generalized, 
implied notions of substantive due process.68 
B. Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment? 
1. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures69 and must be applied to police conduct 
in effectuating arrests, investigatory stops, and seizures.7o If the con-
duct of the officers intentionally terminates the suspect's freedom of 
movement during a police pursuit, then a seizure has occurred; 
therefore, any claim arising from this seizure would be properly an-
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989))); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 
(1979) ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff 
has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and Laws.'''); 1 
NAHMOD, supra note 61, §§ 2:2 to :45. 
64. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The more specific-provision rule is a doctrine of 
constitutional interpretation that favors the use of an explicit textual source 
over an amorphous substantive due process approach that lacks guideposts to 
gauge a claim. See id. at 394-95; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 
272 (1997) ("Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered 
by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amend-
ment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that spe-
cific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process."). 
65. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 84245 (rationalizing substantive due process claims when 
there has been no other cognizable constitutional violation). 
66. For a discussion of Lewis, see infra notes 123-50 and accompanying text. 
67. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. 
68. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text. 
69. The Fourth Amendment assures that" [t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
70. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Court explained that: 
"[A]II claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly 
or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a 
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reason-
ableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach." 
Id. 
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alyzed under the Fourth Amendment.71 Generally, a seizure involves 
some intentional effort by the officer to terminate a suspect's or by-
stander's freedom of movement.72 In determining whether a seizure 
71. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (finding a seizure 
where the police officers set up a roadblock by placing an 18-wheel truck in 
the path of a fleeing suspect, which ultimately resulted in an accident); Latta 
v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693, 696, 699 (lOth Cir. 1997) (explaining that a fleeing 
suspect was seized when he stopped for a two-car roadblock that the police 
had set up to prevent him from traveling any further on the interstate); 
Seekamp v. Michaud, 109 F.3d 802, 804-06 (1st Cir. 1997) (acknowledging a 
Fourth Amendment seizure when state troopers set up a flatbed tractor-trailer 
loaded with lumber across the southbound traffic lanes of the highway and 
other tractor-trailers along the shoulder of the highway into which the plain-
tiff crashed); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 948-49 (7th Cir. 
1994) (concluding that a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred when a 
police officer intentionally backed his cruiser into the path of a fleeing motor-
cyclist and caused a collision that resulted in the rider's death); Adams v. St. 
Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1565, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1992), va-
cated, 998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment seizure 
occurred when a police officer intentionally slammed into a fleeing vehicle to 
halt its flight); Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 421-23 (7th Cir. 1990) (ob-
serving that no Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred when a police of-
ficer unintentionally struck the plaintiff after his motorcycle slid out onto the 
median and he had started to walk back onto the highway); Estate of Story v. 
McDuffie County, 929 F. Supp. 1523, 1527 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (stating that no 
seizure had occurred where the plaintiff's vehicle had crashed while going 
around a curve but had never been touched by the pursuing officer's vehi-
cle); Johnson v. Grob, 928 F. Supp. 889, 889-95 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (construing 
the police officer's actions as a Fourth Amendment seizure when their road-
block caused the plaintiff to put her vehicle in reverse, slam into a parked 
car, and flip her car over); Wozniak v. Cavender, 875 F. Supp. 526, 530, 533 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that no Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred 
when the pursuing officers maintained a distance of one to three car lengths 
and the injured plaintiff ultimately ended up wrecking his all-terrain vehicle 
in a ditch due to driver error); Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F. 
Supp. 1184, 1191-92 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (announcing that no seizure had oc-
curred where a motorcyclist was injured when he failed to negotiate a turn 
and the pursuing officer had merely followed with sirens flashing but made 
no attempts to halt his flight); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 
1253, 1255-57 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (concluding that a Fourth Amendment 
seizure had not occurred when the police had merely given chase and the 
fleeing suspect had run off the road, crashing into a telephone pole). 
72. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. 
It is clear, ... that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur 
whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individ-
ual's freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even when-
ever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired ter-
mination of an individual's freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), 
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has taken place, it is critical that "a person be stopped by the very 
instrumentality [that the officer] set in motion or put in place, in 
order to achieve that result."73 Additionally, if a seizure has oc-
curred, then it must be shown that the officer's actions made it un-
reasonable. 74 This is a lower burden 75 that provides an ideal consti-
tutional ground for challenging police conduct,76 as Fourth 
Amendment claims are analyzed under a reasonableness standard.?7 
Unfortunately, arguing that a seizure occurred during a police pur-
suit is often frivolous if there is no intentional police contact with 
the suspect or bystander; accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment 
becomes an essential tool for attacking an officer's conduct during 
a police pursuit.78 
but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of 
movement through means intentionally applied. 
Id. (emphasis added). The fact that a seizure requires an intentional termina-
tion of movement exemplifies the necessity of substantive due process and 
state tort law in situations where a bystander or uninvolved motorist is unin-
tentionally injured during a police chase. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment does not govern in cases of an attempted 
seizure); Epstein, supra note 22, at 360-61 (contrasting the Fourth Amendment 
standard with the Fourteenth Amendment in police pursuit cases). But see 
Kirst, supra note 5, at 110-13 (advocating the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness standard in cases where uninvolved bystanders are in-
jured because of a high-speed police chase). 
73. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599 ("It was enough here, therefore, that, according to the 
allegations of the complaint, Brower was meant to be stopped by the physical 
obstacle of the roadblock and that he was so stopped."). 
74. See Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Absent a seizure, a 
discussion of the reasonableness of [an officer's] actions would be merely aca-
demic."). 
75. The reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment is a less demanding 
burden than the "shocks the conscience" standard that is now applied in 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Compare Graham, 90 U.S. at 399 ("[T]he 
'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the 
question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their under-
lying intent or motivation."), with Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49 (holding that an 
intent to harm must be shown for an actionable Fourteenth Amendment 
claim). 
76. See supra note 65. 
77. By its own terms, the language of the Fourth Amendment mandates a reason-
ableness inquiry. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
78. See Mesler, supra note 22, at 801-05 (advocating a Fourth Amendment analysis 
in bystander cases while realizing in practice that most claims will fall under 
substantive due process); if. Alpert et ai., Constitutional Implications, supra note 
2, at 660-62 (arguing the necessity of a lower standard under substantive due 
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2. Fourteenth Amendment19 
The Fourteenth Amendment contains substantive rights not 
enumerated.80 It is well established that: "the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government 
from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of op-
pression."81 The Due Process Clause has been interpreted as a limi-
tation on a state actor's power to act arbitrarily and is not a blanket 
safeguard for protected interests.82 Deprivations of due process arise 
from conduct that is the result of some deliberate action on the 
part of a governmental officiaP3 
process in order to allow recovery in police pursuit cases). 
79. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
reads in pertinent part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
80. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (holding that a 
law forbidding contraceptive use by married couples violates the right to pri-
vacy implied in the Fourteenth Amendment); see also David H. Armistead, Sub-
stantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials' Power to Terminate State-Created Pr0p-
erty Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769, 773 (1995) (characterizing due process as 
"one of the most important protectors of individual rights not specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution"); Edlund, supra note 5, at 179; Franklin J. 
Whittlesey, Casenote, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment-Substantive Due Pro-
cess-Malicious Prosecution Does not Constitute a Deprivation of Liberty Actionabk as 
a Constitutional Tort Pursuant to the Due Process Clause-Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. 
Ct. 807 (1994),5 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 269, 277 (1994). 
81. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (quoting DeShaney 
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (quoting 
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986»); see, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levin-
son, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Sub-
stance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 321-32 (1991) 
(discussing the traditional role of substantive due process as a deterrent to 
government misconduct). 
82. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
83. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (deliberately destroying 
an inmate's property); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653, 673-74 (1977) 
(disciplining a student); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (pump-
ing a suspect's stomach for drugs); see also Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in 
Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process Protection Against Excessive 
Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 399, 413 (1990) 
("Due process, said the Court, is concerned with 'deliberate' decisions by 
state officials that constitute an 'abuse of power.''' (quoting Daniels v. Wil-
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The protections invoked by a procedural due process claim, 
which address the adequacy of notice and hearing before a state 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property,84 are distinguishable from 
the rights protected by substantive due process.85 Substantive due 
process is actionable as a direct challenge to certain government 
conduct, regardless of the government's satisfaction of notice and 
hearing requirements.86 The Supreme Court has explicitly recog-
nized that the substantive rights of the Due Process Clause extend 
beyond any requirement of fair procedure-substantive due process 
protects a broader scope of interests than procedural due process.87 
Iiams, 474 U.S. 327,331-32 (1986»). 
84. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 
(1972); Matthew S. Buttacavoli, Casenote, Must Post-Termination Procedural Due 
Process Include a Full, Trial-like Evidentiary Hearing? A Critique of Townsel v. San 
Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1109, 1114 (1999) (citing 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 223,233 (1863»). 
85. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 61, § 3.55; 1 SILVER, supra note 61, § 8A.06[8] ("The 
function of substantive due process as promulgated by Rochin is to serve as a 
constitutional 'catch-all' for egregious misconduct which cannot be character-
ized as a violation of a specific constitutional right. "). 
86. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 48, § 3.55; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 13.1, at 510-11 (5th ed. 1995) (elaborating on 
the difference between the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process 
and procedural due process protections). 
87. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 528 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (explaining that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain areas of protected liberties); 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 84648 (1992) 
(delineating the differences between the procedural and substantive protec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125-28 (1992) (explaining the care with which substantive due pro-
cess claims must be handled because of the lack of clear guideposts for judi-
cial interpretation). Noted constitutional law scholars, John E. Nowak and 
Ronald D. Rotunda, have commented: 
By "substantive review" we mean the judicial determination of the 
compatibility of the substance of a law or governmental action with 
the Constitution. The Court is concerned with the constitutionality of 
the underlying rule [or executive action] rather than with the fair-
ness of the process by which the government applies the rule to an 
individual .... The concept the Court employs to control the sub-
stance of legislation under the due process clause is that certain types 
of lawmaking [or executive action] go beyond any proper sphere of 
governmental activity. In short, the Court views the act as incompati-
ble with our democratic system of government and individual liberty. 
The judicial premise for this position is that any life, liberty, or prop-
erty limited by such a law [or executive action] is taken without due 
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In the context of liability for injuries attributed to police 
chases, the protection of substantive due process is implicated by a 
police officer's abuse of power that is "so egregious or outrageous 
that no state post-deprivation remedy can adequately serve to pre-
serve a person's constitutional guarantees of freedom from such 
conduct."88 A claim is properly analyzed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a violation of substantive due process if a police pur-
suit results in injury and occurs either without any intentional physi-
cal control over the suspect or results in harm to an innocent by-
stander.89 Due to the nature of most police pursuit cases, which 
process because the Constitution never granted the government the 
ability to pass such a law [or take such an action]. 
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, infra note 86, § 10.6, at 34647; see also Edlund, supra note 
5, at 181 ("Substantive due process rights provide plaintiffs with a broad 
residual theory to challenge the root of governmental misconduct." (citing 
VINCENT R FONTANA, MUNICIPAL LIABIUTY: LAw AND PRACTICE § 4.8 (1990»). 
Maryland's constitution contains an analogous due process provision-ar-
ticle 24 of the Declaration of Rights-which also contains a substantive com-
ponent. See Branch v. McGeeney, 123 Md. App. 330, 352, 718 A.2d 631, 642 
(1998) ("[The federal due process] clause is generally interpreted as being sy-
nonymous with article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." (citing 
Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 483, 13 A.2d 763, 768 (1940»). In addition, the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the substantive component embodied in 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides authoritative guidance to the interpreta-
tion of article 24. See Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d 
1052, 1056 (1980); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 15, 136 A.2d 852, 
854-55 (1957); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 686, 7 A.2d 
176, 178 (1939). 
88. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991). 
89. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1998) (stating that 
the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper provision from which to challenge 
the conduct of a police officer during a high-speed chase of a motorcycle and 
a passenger that was chased for several miles and followed closely, but never 
seized); On ossian v. Block, 175 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (employing a 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis where a fleeing "muscle car" 
was never touched by the pursuing officers and crashed into an uninvolved 
motorist); Boveri v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1997) (examining 
a chase under the Fourteenth Amendment where the police officers stayed 
several car lengths behind the fleeing suspect's vehicle, which did not stop 
until it eventually hydroplaned into an uninvolved motorist); Evans v. Avery, 
100 F.3d 1033, 1036 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that absent a seizure, those injured 
during a police pursuit may prosecute a § 1983 claim under substantive due 
process); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 104647 (7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim brought against a police officer where there 
was no contact between the officer's and the suspect's vehicles and the sus-
pect's vehicle came to a stop after striking an uninvolved motorist); Fagan v. 
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generally do not involve an unreasonable Fourth Amendment 
seizure,9o substantive due process becomes the central focus for re-
covery. While the Fourteenth Amendment's value as a vehicle for re-
covery is not questioned, the standard for judging the egregiousness 
of the police officer's actions has been far from clear. Therefore, a 
discussion of each of the differing standards that have been applied 
III Fourteenth Amendment cases is germane. 
C. The Substantive Due Process Split Among the Circuits 
Analyzing a growing number of police pursuit cases as potential 
violations of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, the 
federal circuit courts split as to the appropriate level of culpability 
necessary to impose liability.91 The result was the application of two 
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1299-1301, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (ex-
amining a Fourteenth Amendment case where the police chased a speeding 
Camaro throughout a city and nearby residential neighborhood before it ran 
a red light and plowed into the side of a pickup truck); Temkin v. Frederick 
County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 717-19 (4th Cir. 1991) (evaluating a high-
speed chase under the Fourteenth Amendment where the fleeing suspect's ve-
hicle sideswiped an uninvolved motorist's vehicle without having any contact 
with the pursuing police vehicle); Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2 
(6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a substantive due process analysis is preserved 
for those actions of a police officer other than a seizure); Feist v. Simonson, 
36 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139-41, 1144 (N.D. Minn. 1999) (analyzing a bystander 
case under the Fourteenth Amendment where a limousine driver was killed 
instantly when his car was struck by a fleeing suspect); Corbin v. City of 
Springfield, 942 F. Supp. 721, 723, 725 (D. Mass. 1996) (undertaking a Four-
teenth Amendment analysis' where an innocent motorist was struck at an in-
tersection by the fleeing suspect's vehicle). 
90. An analysis of all the possible implications of a Fourth Amendment seizure in 
the police chase context is not within the scope of this Comment. For a brief 
discussion of the potential nexus between an officer or municipality's liability 
for injuries suffered during a high-speed chase and the Fourth Amendment, 
see supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. 
91. See Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 439 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations 
omitted) rev'd, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1998) (ap-
plying a shocks the conscience test). This was especially troublesome in this 
area of the law because: 
In the framework of police pursuit situations, police misconduct can 
best be kept within constitutional norms by maintaining one clear, 
objective standard of liability .... The need for a concrete Four-
teenth Amendment standard is shown by the confusion within the 
lower federal courts and the less than enthusiastic regard many ju-
rists have for substantive due process analysis. 
Edlund, supra note 5, at 205. However, it is interesting that the Supreme 
Court nonetheless retains the potential to distinguish Fourteenth Amendment 
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dissimilar standards: one, the "deliberate" or "reckless indifferent" 
standard, that turns on the concerns of public safety and imposes a 
lower burden for liability;92 and the other, the "shocks the con-
science" standard, a pro-police stance that places an extremely high 
bar to an injured plaintiff's claim.93 
1. "Deliberate" or "Reckless Indifference" Standard 
In the recent past,94 some federal circuits adopted a "deliber-
ate" or "reckless indifference" standard that hedges between the 
competing policies underlying police pursuit liability-something a 
little more than mere negligence, but something less than inten-
tional conduct.95 To recover under this standard, a plaintiff must 
violations during a high-speed chase from violations of an inmate's rights 
while incarcerated. See infra note 141. 
92. See, e.g., Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating the stan-
dard for substantive due process violations is not clearly established, but sug-
gesting a deliberate indifference approach); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 
1556 n.7 (lIth Cir. 1994) (rejecting a shocks the conscience standard as inap-
plicable in civil cases for money damages); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 
1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying a gross negligence standard); see also Alpert et 
ai., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 627-38 (providing a general over-
view of the circuits that have adopted the deliberate or "reckless indifference" 
standard). 
93. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 (1st Cir. 1996), cm. denied, 520 U.S. 
1210 (1997) (adopting a shocks the conscience standard where chase oc-
curred in a highly congested area but lasted no more than two minutes and 
never exceeded 50 miles per hour); Williams v. City of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009, 
1014-15 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting a shocks the conscience standard); Fagan 
v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (adopting 
a shocks the conscience standard where multiple police cars pursued a sus-
pect's vehicle through residential neighborhood at speeds reaching 80 miles 
per hour); Temkin, 945 F.2d at 719 (adopting a shocks the conscience standard 
where a police chase down a narrow, two-lane highway reached speeds of 105 
miles per hour); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting 
a shocks the conscience standard where pursuit in unmarked police vehicle 
reached speeds of 100 miles per hour down Louisiana interstate). 
94. See Finarelli, supra note 36, at 242 (noting that although the deliberate indif-
ference standard "has been applied predominantly in several contexts outside 
the high-speed police pursuit context," this standard has been applied to de-
termine liability in police chases within the "last decade or so") (citations 
omitted). 
95. See Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
reckless intent does not require a showing of intent to harm). The court 
adopted a reckless indifference standard. See id. In order for the officer to be 
liable, it would be sufficient that there was awareness of a known or obvious 
risk, substantial enough that there was a high probability that serious harm 
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show that the police officer created a dangerous condition and ac-
ted with deliberate indifference to subject the plaintiff to a known 
or obvious danger.96 Deliberate indifference implies a reckless state 
of mind more in tune with mental states under criminal law, rather 
than in a tort sense.97 Such a state of mind requires an element of 
actual knowledge or willful blindness to a known impending harm.98 
2. The "Shocks the Conscience" Standard 
The "shocks the conscience" standard establishes a standard of 
care somewhere99 between the deliberate indifference standard and 
absolute immunity. tOO To shock the conscience, the conduct of the 
would follow. See id. 
96. See L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1996); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 
F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989). 
97. See Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899-900 (citing Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 
953,956 (1st Cir. 1992». 
98. See id. For example, in Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, a supervisory officer was 
held liable where a patrol officer shot and killed an innocent suspect. See Gu-
tierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 557, 564 (1st Cir. 1989). In hold-
ing the supervisor liable, the court relied on a deliberate indifference stan-
dard. See id. at 562. The court explained that this standard had been met 
because the supervisor had knowledge of the patrol officer's prior record, re-
ceived multiple citizen complaints regarding the same officer, and failed to 
institute any disciplinary action. See id. at 566. 
99. Historically, the shocks the conscience standard has been criticized for its lack 
of clarity. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Easterbrook, j., concurring) (" [A] 'shocks the conscience' test spurns bright 
lines. It spurns rules. It is a vague standard ... inviting all decisionmakers to 
consult their sensibilities rather than objective circumstances."). 
In the words of one noted commentator: 
[T]he "shocks the conscience" standard involves an amorphous and 
imprecise inquiry. Further, whose conscience must be "shocked"-
the judge or the jury? As there is no clear indication as to what con-
stitutes conscience shocking behavior, many circuits have blindly ap-
plied this restrictive, but undefinable, standard and denied recovery 
for victims of police pursuit accidents. On the other hand, the delib-
erate or reckless indifference standard is well-known to the law and 
capable of easy definition. 
Alpert et aI., Constitutional Implications, supra note 2, at 661-62. 
100. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 (1998). According to one author, the Supreme 
Court's reluctance to expand the parameters of substantive due process con-
vinced at least one court to adopt the shocks the conscience standard in po-
lice pursuit cases, regardless of previous case law applying the reckless disre-
gard standard. See Edlund, supra note 5, at 197-98 n.174 (discussing Fagan v. 
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that 
the court "cannot ignore the Supreme Court's repeated warnings against an 
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police officer must be outrageous or offensive to an individual's 
sense of justice. 101 This standard requires a look into the mind of 
the police officer. 102 However, this is not the sole inquiry. A proper 
analysis also includes any abuse of the officer's official police au-
thority granted to the officer by the government103 and the degree 
of discretion entrusted to police officers in the daily performance of 
their duties. 104 To better understand the heightened burden that the 
shocks the conscience standard entails, an analysis of a Fourth Cir-
cuit case that adopted the standard is particularly appropriate. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
adopted the shocks the conscience standard in a police pursuit in 
Temkin v. Frederick County Commissioners. 105 In Temkin, an uninvolved 
driver was seriously injured when the car she was driving was hit by 
both the suspect's and the pursuing officer's vehicles. 106 After the 
district court granted Frederick County's motion for summary judg-
ment,107 the issue of whether the shocks the conscience standard 
should be applied to impose liability for Fourteenth Amendment vi-
olations was ripe for the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. 108 
The pursuit in Temkin first began when the officer observed a 
car racing out of a gas station and spinning its wheels. 109 During the 
chase, the officer heard over his radio that the suspect had stolen 
seventeen dollars worth of gas. 110 Both cars reached speeds of 65 to 
105 miles per hour on a narrow two-lane highway that traversed 
populated areas. lll The suspect lost control of his vehicle on a 
overly generous interpretation of the substantive component of the due pro-
cess clause" (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994»). 
101. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1303-04 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 
(1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945»). A recent 
opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit provides 
an excellent example of conduct that is shocking to the conscience. See Rog-
ers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998); see also infra note 149. 
102. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 61, § 3.8-9. 
103. See Rankin v. City of Witchita Falls, 762 F.2d 444, 44748 (5th Cir. 1985). 
104. See id. 
105. 945 F.2d 716,720 (4th Cir. 1991). 
106. See id. at 718. 
107. See id. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland specifically 
granted summary judgment in regard to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. See id. 
108. See id. at 719-24. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. At one point, the chase proceeded through a carnival area where cars 
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curve, striking Temkin's vehicle. 1I2 Then, the pursuing officer hit 
Temkin's careening vehicle broadside at approximately sixty miles 
per hour.113 Due to the accident, Temkin suffered severe and perma-
nent injuries. 1I4 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ap-
proved the district court's adoption of the shocks the conscience 
standard.1I5 The court considered whether the officer's conduct was 
so shocking that it constituted an abuse of state power, violating 
Temkin's substantive due process rights. 1I6 The court held that the 
officer's conduct, although "disturbing and lacking in judgment,"ll7 
failed to rise to the level of conscience shocking. liB Therefore, the 
grant of summary judgment was proper1l9 because Temkin had 
failed to state a cognizable violation of substantive due process. l20 
lined both sides of the road. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. at 720. 
116. See id. 
117. /d. at 723. 
118. See id. Temkin raised five specific facts in an attempt to show that the officer's 
conduct shocked the conscience: 
(1) the chase continued for a significant period of time over a ten 
mile area; (2) the chase continued at a very high rate of speed; (3) 
the chase was initiated because of a minor violation; (4) the police 
already had, at a minimum, a partial identification of the license 
plate of the suspect vehicle; and (5) the chase violated [a police de-
partment order], because [the officer] failed to maintain radio con-
tact with his supervisor throughout. 
Id. The on-duty supervisor was responding to another call and did not moni-
tor the pursuing officer's chase, in part because his own radio was inoperative. 
See id. at 718. 
119. By finding that the pursuing officer had not committed a potential Four-
teenth Amendment violation, the court further concluded that Temkin had 
similarly failed to make a cognizable claim against the Frederick County Com-
missioners for inadequate training and supervision. See id. at 723-27. 
120. See id. The Temkin court distinguished police pursuits from other scenarios in 
which a Fourteenth Amendment violation may be found. According to the 
Temkin court, "we do not today address the question of whether the same 
[shocks the conscience] standard applies in those cases, such as incarceration 
or involuntary foster care, where governmental control over the claimant is 
intentional and direct." /d. (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th 
Cir. 1988». In Martin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit explained that "a pretrial detainee makes out a due process violation if 
he shows 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.''' Id. at 72 (quot-
ing Martin, 849 F.2d at 871 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
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As demonstrated by Temkin, the shocks the conscience standard 
is a difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet. Until recently, other cir~ 
cuits have permitted Fourteenth Amendment claims based on the 
lower burden of deliberate indifference. 121 However, the Supreme 
Court recently resolved this inconsistency by explicitly adopting the 
"shocks the conscience" standard for police pursuit situations and 
ending the split among the federal circuits. 122 
D. The Supreme Court Announces Its Position on the Standard oj Care Jor 
Determining Police Liability in High~speed Pursuits-Actions Speak Louder 
Than Words 
In County oj Sacramento v. Lewis,123 the Supreme Court set forth 
the proper standard for determining when substantive due process 
rights have been violated during police pursuit casesl24 by adopting 
the shocks the conscience standard. 125 The facts in Lewis illustrate 
the heightened burden that the shocks the conscience test places 
on the plaintiff in a police pursuit case. 126 
Dispatched to break up a fight, an officer arrived at the scene 
around 8:30 p.m. and observed a motorcycle with two riders ap-
proaching at a high rate of speed. 127 The driver of the motorcycle 
was eighteen year old Brian Willard and the passenger was sixteen 
year old Philip Lewis. 128 With the assistance of another officer, the 
officer attempted to block the motorcycle's path.129 The motorcycle 
evaded the officers and sped Off.130 One of the officers took up the 
pursuit. 131 The chase lasted for about seventy~five seconds through a 
busy residential area, with both parties reaching speeds of 100 miles 
(1976»). The Supreme Court has made a similar distinction between injuries 
incurred during police pursuits and injuries flowing from police incarcera-
tion. See infra note 141. 
121. See supra Part III.C.l. 
122. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 84647 (1998). 
123. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
124. See id. at 839. The Court explained that certiorari was granted to resolve the 
conflict among the circuits regarding the police pursuit cases under substan-
tive due process. See id. 
125. See id. at 84649. 
126. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. 
127. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 836-37. 
131. See id. at 837. 
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per hour.132 
Refusing to back down, the pursuing officer followed the mo-
torcycle at distances as short as 100 feet. 133 The chase ended when 
Willard failed to negotiate a tight left turn and his motorcycle 
tipped over, ejecting both driver and passenger onto the roadway.l34 
Following closely and with little time to react, the officer slammed 
on his brakes. 135 He avoided the driver, but ran into Lewis at about 
forty miles per hour.136 The impact propelled Lewis approximately 
seventy feet down the road and inflicted serious injuries to his 
body.137 Lewis died at the scene. 138 
Mter initially rejecting a Fourth Amendment analysis,139 the 
Court determined the appropriateness of the substantive due pro-
cess claim. 140 The Court placed great weight on the fact that police 
officers lack time to make considered decisions and need to take al-
most instinctive, split-second action. 141 The Court then explained 
132. See id. at 836-37. 
133. See id. at 837. At a distance so close and with such a high-speed, the officer 
would have needed 650 additional feet in order to stop his car. See id. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. The intensity of the impact sprayed Lewis's blood over the entire wind-
shield of the patrol car and ruptured every major organ in his body. See Re-
spondent's Brief at 2, Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833 (No. 96-1337) (citing the officer's 
deposition) . 
138. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 837. 
139. See id. at 84344. The Court rejected any argument that Lewis was seized. See 
id. 
140. See id. at 842-46. The Court emphasized: "The touchstone of due process is 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Id. at 
845 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,558 (1974». 
141. See id. at 850-53. The Court distinguished a pursuit situation from a challenge 
to a prison official's misconduct under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 851. 
In a prison custody situation, the reckless indifference standard would still ap-
ply. See id. Under a custody situation, the prison official is responsible for the 
welfare of the inmates and has the luxury of considered forethought. See id. 
Additionally, there are no countervailing concerns which might excuse a 
prison official from taking action for the inmate's welfare. See id. A police of-
ficer has none of these luxuries when deciding whether to act. See id. at 852-
53. This distinction reflects the inability for mechanical application of substan-
tive due process principles. 
[A] ttention to the markedly different circumstances of normal pre-
trial custody and high-speed law enforcement chases shows why the 
deliberate indifference that shocks in the one case is less egregious 
in the other (even assuming that it makes sense to speak of in differ-
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that to make a cognizable claim of executive abuse of power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in a police pursuit situation, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the pursuing officer's actions shock the con-
science. 142 The Court held that "high-speed chases with no intent to 
harm suspects physically or worsen their legal plight do not give rise 
to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an ac-
tion under § 1983."143 
Looking to the facts, the Court found that the officer had ac-
ted within the bounds of his job as a law enforcement officer.l44 The 
officer had not acted with any intent to induce the suspect's lawless-
ness nor with any intent to terrorize, harm, or kill him.145 Further, 
any prudence on the officer's part was subject to the countervailing 
demands of law enforcement. 146 Therefore, regardless of whether 
the officer had overstepped a tort law standard of reasonableness, 
his actions had failed to rise to a level that would shock the 
conscience. 147 
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that the shocks the 
conscience standard leaves little room for recovery where an of-
ficer's conduct is challenged under Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive due process. 148 In fact, the shocks the conscience test exists 
ence as deliberate in the case of sudden pursuit). 
[d. at 851. 
142. See id. at 846. As to the fluidity of the shocks the conscience standard, the 
Court noted: "While the measure of what is conscience-shocking is no cali-
brated yard stick, it does, as Judge Friendly put it, 'point the way.'" [d. at 847 
(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973». 
143. [d. at 854. 
144. See id. at 855. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. This point clarifies the positIon of the Court that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever sys-
tems may already be administered by the states." [d. at 847 (quoting Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976». Similarly, this point also reaffirms another 
earlier statement by the Court that "'[o]ur constitution [sic] deals with the 
large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to 
supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liabil-
ity for injuries that attend living together in society.'" [d. (quoting Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986». 
148. Since Lewis, there have been several federal circuit court opinions applying 
the shocks the conscience standard to challenges to a police officer's actions. 
See, e.g., Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 
1998) (holding that an officer who inadvertently shot the wrong man during a 
gunfight did not violate substantive due process); Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 
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mainly to preserve the Fourteenth Amendment for extremely egre-
gious and flagrant abuses of governmental authority.149 Therefore, 
state law becomes the primary vehicle to impose liability on a police 
officer's conduct that fails to shock the conscience. 150 
IV. POLICE LIABILITY IN MARYLAND 
To assess an officer's conduct for potential liability under Mary-
land law, an attorney must understand the interplay of common-law 
principles and the statutory regime. In Maryland, the government 
and its employees are protected by sovereign immunity,151 a doc-
trine which bars all suits against the state absent legislative permis-
sion. 152 While full immunity has traditionally been granted to the 
793, 798-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an officer who unintentionally shot a 
crime victim in the course of a botched arrest tailed to evince the requisite 
purpose to harm necessary for a substantive due process violation); Rogers v. 
City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that an officer 
who raped a citizen violated her substantive due process rights); Radecki v. 
Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1228, 1232 (lOth Cir. 1998) (explaining that there 
would be no violation of substantive due process when a citizen assisting an 
officer was shot in the struggle with a suspect); Courville v. City of Lake 
Charles, 720 So. 2d 789, 802 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an officer who 
undertook a high-speed chase through city streets resulting in the death of 
the fleeing suspect did not violate substantive due process). 
149. Of the cases decided since Lewis, Rogers provides a graphic example of an of-
ficer's conduct that was deemed conscience shocking. See Rogers, 152 F.3d at 
796-97. In Rogers, the officer, after pulling the plaintiff over for a minor traffic 
stop, followed her home and raped her. See id. at 793-94. The officer re-
mained in uniform throughout the incident. See id. at 794. The court held 
that, "[the] rape was an intentional act that produced constitutional injury 
and that was an 'arbitrary exercise of government, unrestrained by the estab-
lished principles of private right and distributive justice.'" Id. at 797 (quoting 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (l884))). The court then affirmed a $100,000 
damage award against the officer in his personal capacity. See id. at 798. 
150. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 n.14. The Lewis Court noted that simply because the 
officer's conduct did not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion does not "imply anything about its appropriate treatment under state 
law." Id. 
151. See Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 54-55, 405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979) 
("Once venerated, recently vilified, and presently substantially limited, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity has been long recognized by this Court."). 
152. See Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260 
A.2d 296, 299 (1970); see also Board of Trustees of Howard Community Col-
lege v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583, 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976) (noting 
that a state agency cannot waive immunity, even if the agency fails to plead 
it); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 474, 287 A.2d 40, 42 (1972). 
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State, there has never been an extension of absolute immunity to 
the State's counties and municipalities. 153 Originally based on the 
ancient common-law premise that "the King can do no wrong,"154 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity has recently been modified by 
the Maryland General AssemblyI55 to serve the existing public policy 
concerns of modern government. 156 This suggests the Legislature's 
awareness of the inherent unfairness of leaving those injured at the 
hands of state employees without a remedy.157 
The Jekofsky court observed: "[I] t is desirable and in the public interest that 
any change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the leg-
islative branch of the State Government rather than from the judicial 
branch." Id. See generally Charles A. Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland 
Lawyers: Judicial Relief for Violations of Rights, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 102, 122-33 
(1980) (discussing the limitations imposed by various governmental and offi-
cial immunities on judicial review under both federal and Maryland law); 
Steven D. Frenkil, Comment, The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sover-
eign Immunity in Tort in Maryland, 36 MD. L. REv. 653, 654-58 (1977) (explain-
ing the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Maryland). 
153. In the case of counties and municipalities, there is a distinction drawn be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions. See Tadjer v. Montgomery 
County, 300 Md. 539, 549, 479 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1984) (discussing the need to 
discern between a government and proprietary function); Austin, 286 Md. at 
63, 405 A.2d at 261 (holding that the city was involved in a governmental 
function in the operation of a day camp). A municipality is immune only if it 
is performing a governmental function, rather than a proprietary function, 
when the individual is allegedly injured. See Austin, 286 Md. at 63, 405 A.2d at 
261. To determine whether a function is governmental, one must focus on 
whether "the act in question is sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for 
the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the municipality, 
and tends to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole 
public, and has in it no element of private interest." Id. at 60, 405 A.2d at 260 
(quoting E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 383, 252 
A.2d 824, 824 (1969». Distinguishing between proprietary and governmental 
functions can be difficult; as noted by the court of appeals, "[ t] he distinction 
between governmental and proprietary functions is sometimes illusory in prac-
tice." E. Eyring & Sons Co., 253 Md. at 382, 252 A.2d at 825. 
154. Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d 
1027, 1030 (1979). 
155. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
These provisions, which provide a broad waiver of the State's tort immunity, 
are known generally as the "Maryland Tort Claims Act." Id. § 12-110. 
156. See Frenkil, supra note 152, at 658. There has been a shift to the view that the 
doctrine is based on the inappropriateness of diverting public funds for pri-
vate use. See id. Further, allowing private recovery from the state can place 
such a burden on its ability to govern that the larger concerns of the public 
will go unanswered. See id. at 658-62. 
157. The Act shall be construed broadly to effectuate the stated purpose, which is 
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In relation to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the doctrine 
of public official immunity protects a government employee from 
individual liability for negligence. 15S To be immune from liability, 
the government actor must be a public official and the challenged 
conduct must have occurred while the official was performing a dis-
cretionary act. 159 Once both of these prongs are satisfied, "a quali-
fied immunity attaches; namely in the absence of malice, the indi-
vidual involved is free from liability." 160 When analyzing police 
pursuit issues in Maryland, an attorney must remember these com-
mon-law doctrines, as they provide the underlying framework for 
the various statutory enactments that follow. 
A. Maryland Tort Claims Act 
The Maryland General Assembly enacted the Maryland Tort 
Claims Actl61 with the goal of affording a remedy to individuals in-
jured by tortious conduct attributable to the State. 162 Until its enact-
ment, the State and its various agencies could not be sued without 
legislative authorization and an availability of funds. 163 The statute 
waives state governmental immunity from tort actions for simple 
negligence and provides a statutory cap of $200,000 on such 
claims. l64 The challenged conduct must be committed by state per-
"ensur[ing] that injured parties have a remedy." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T 
§ 12-102 (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
158. SeeJames v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 323-24, 418 A.2d 1173, 1178 
(1980). 
159. See id. The court set up a two part test: (1) the government actor must be a 
"public official rather than a mere government employee," and (2) the chal-
lenged conduct must have occurred while "performing discretionary, as op-
posed to ministerial acts." Id. 
160. See Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 673, 541 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1988) 
(citing Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 302-04, 396 A.2d 
255,260-61 (1979), overruled by, James, 288 Md. at 329-36, 418 A.2d at 1181-84; 
Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 34647, 278 A.2d 71, 74 
(1971) ). 
161. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
162. See id. § 12-102. 
163. See Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 44849, 545 A.2d 1312, 1314-17 
(1988). In order for sovereign immunity to be waived, there must be two con-
ditions met: " [f]irst, the General Assembly must authorize suits for damages; 
and second, there must be a provision for the payment of judgments." Id. at 
455, 545 A.2d at 1317. 
164. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-104 (a) (2) (1998). Section (c) of 12-104 
allows for the payment of claims exceeding $200,000 if certain conditions are 
met. See id. at § 12-104(c). 
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sonnel acting within the scope of their official duties for the State's 
immunity to be waived}65 If the official's actions either fall outside 
the scope of duty or are made with malice or gross negligence, the 
State's immunity will not be waived and the state employee can be 
held individually liable. 166 
This statute balances the interests that are invoked by the de-
bate over liability for injuries suffered during police pursuits. 167 It 
creates a broad remedy for injured third parties, while at the same 
time providing a safe harbor that relieves state employees of liability 
for acts of simple negligence. 168 While the Maryland Tort Claims Act 
creates a broad remedy for citizens injured by any state employee's 
negligence, a statute set forth in the Transportation Article provides 
more specific provisions from which to gauge a police officer's neg-
ligent conduct. 
B. Section 19-103 oj the Transportation Article 
Section 19-103 of the Transportation Article169 provides that the 
owner or lessee of an emergency vehicle is liable "for any damages 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an authorized operator 
while operating the emergency vehicle in the performance of emer-
gency service."170 As defined by the statute, emergency service in-
cludes "pursuing a violator or a suspected violator of the law." 17l Put 
simply, this provision places liability on the owner or lessee of the 
emergency vehicle for acts of simple negligence committed by the 
driver.172 However, this statute provides that a police officer is indi-
vidually immune from liability when operating an emergency vehi-
cle in the performance of emergency service. 173 Therefore, even 
though this statute provides a remedy that governmental immunity 
might otherwise block, it also may be a minefield to erase other ave-
nues of recovery that may be available. 
165. See id. 
166. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b) (1998). 
167. See supra notes 1642 and accompanying text. 
168. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-104 (a)-(b) (1998). 
169. MD. CODE ANN .. TRANSP. II § 19-103 (1999). 
170. Id. § 19-103(c). 
171. Id. § 19-103(a)(3)(ii). 
172. See id. § 19-103(c) (providing for liability to the extent afforded by MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-639 (1998». 
173. See id. § 19-103 (b). 
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V. PRACTICAL STRATEGIES IN DECISION-MAKING 
Litigating an officer's personal liability for various acts or omis-
sions in the scope of official duties can be a daunting task. Tying all 
of these provisions together can be tricky. Each cause of action has 
a different result depending on who is chosen as a defendant-the 
police officer or the municipality. Based on an officer's common-law 
duty of due care owed to others on the roadway, the Maryland po-
lice officer owes a tort duty of care to a plaintiff injured by a sus-
pected criminal if the officer "place [s a citizen] within a 'zone of 
danger without reasonable justification,' and set[s] in motion a 
chain of events which [he] knew or should have known would lead 
to ... injur[y]."174 When assessing the officer's actions to determine 
a breach of duty, an attorney must consider a number of factors in-
cluding road conditions, amount of traffic in the area, pedestrian 
traffic, time of day, weather conditions, gravity of the offense the 
suspect allegedly committed, and the spontaneous nature of the of-
ficer's judgment. 175 Moreover, the officer's judgment should be 
viewed in light of what a reasonable officer at the scene would have 
faced without the benefit of hindsight. 176 Where an injury to a by-
stander is at issue, plaintiff's counsel must state with specificity all 
allegations of negligence which proximately caused a client's 
harm.m Once an attorney finds that a duty was in fact owed and 
states the allegations of breach, the next step is to consider the ef-
fect of the common-law doctrines and statutes. 178 
174. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 586, 594 A.2d 121, 135 (1991) (grappling with 
multiple claims arising from the death of a couple killed when struck by a 
fleeing suspect's vehicle) (quoting Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 589, 591, 
420 A.2d 261, 266-67 (1980». In Boyer, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ex-
tended the scope of an officer's common-law duty of care to cover both those 
directly involved with the officer and innocent bystanders. Seeid. at 584-85, 
594 A.2d at 134-35. 
175. As a case of first impression, the Boyer court in dictum suggested these factors 
be taken into account when assessing the new-found duty. See id. at 590, 594 
A.2d at 137. Further, the court suggested particular aggravating circum-
stances: (1) violation of police department policies or guidelines; (2) failure 
to turn on warning devices; and (3) extremely high-speeds in congested areas. 
See id. at 591, 594 A.2d at 137. 
176. See id. at 587-89, 594 A.2d at 136-37 (recognizing that an officer's conduct 
should be judged not by hindsight, but "in light of how a reasonable officer 
would respond faced with the same difficult emergency situation"). 
177. See id. at 589 n.20, 594 A.2d at 136 n.20. 
178. See discussion supra Part III; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
639( e) (1998). 
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Under Maryland law, the officer is granted governmental im-
munity from a personal liability suit for simple negligence. 179 This is 
in part because, as noted by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland: 
[A]n employee of the Maryland State Police, sworn as a po-
lice officer, is for police powers on duty twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week, fIfty-two weeks a year, and where he 
acts as a law enforcement officer, he is under the protec-
tion of the Maryland Tort Claims Act.180 
To pierce the limited immunity provided by the Maryland Tort 
Claims Act and hold the officer individually liable, the officer's ac-
tions must be malicious or sufficiently wanton and reckless to con-
stitute gross negligence. 181 However, vaguely pleading malice or 
gross negligence is insufficient to remove the protective umbrella of 
immunity from the actions of a police officer; the plaintiff must 
make a strong showing of facts evincing wanton or reckless 
behavior. 182 
There are also situations in which the doctrine of public official 
immunity will bar any recovery from an officer individually.183 If an 
officer is acting in a discretionary manner and chooses not to ap-
prehend a fleeing suspect, the officer is generally immune from suit 
if the suspect proceeds to injure others.184 In such situations, the of-
fIcer owes no tort duty of care to third persons. 185 Looking beyond 
an officer's individual liability, however, situations are likely to arise 
179. See supra Part lILA. While the officer may be immune, the state can still be 
held liable to a certain extent. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text. 
180. Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. 72, 83-84, 570 A.2d 341, 347' (1990), rev'd on 
other grounds, 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467 (1991). 
181. See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 578-79, 594 A.2d 121, 131-32 (1991). According 
to the Buyer court: "In order to charge Trooper Titus with gross negligence, 
the plaintiffs must have pled facts showing that Trooper Titus acted with a 
wanton and reckless disregard for others in pursuing .... " Id. at 579, 594 
A.2d at 132. 
182. See Humphries, 82 Md. App. at 86, 570 A.2d at 348; see also Buyer, 323 Md. at 
580, 594 A.2d at 132. The plaintiffs in Buyer alleged that the trooper drove at a 
high rate of speed in a congested area, failed to immediately activate emer-
gency equipment, and violated police procedures. See Buyer, 323 Md. at 580, 
594 A.2d at 132. The court concluded that, "these somewhat vague allegations 
do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence." Id. 
183. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
184. See Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 626-35, 510 A.2d 1078, 
1081 (1986). 
185. See id. 
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where an attorney can attempt to hold local municipalities liable for 
the actions of their officers. 
Under Maryland law, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are constitu-
tional officers subject to the control of the Maryland General As-
sembly.186 As constitutional officers some of their actions are per-
formed as state government employees. 187 Furthermore, county 
agencies are generally not liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for tortious acts committed by these state employees. 188 Ac-
cordingly, an attempt to hold a municipality or local government 
unit liable as an employer under the Maryland Tort Claims Actl89 
for the actions of a sheriff or deputy will not always suffice. l90 
However, all is not lost. If an attorney alleges that the munici-
pality owns the police vehicle driven by the sheriff or deputy sheriff, 
then a claim might be viable. 191 If the sheriff or deputy sheriff was 
negligent in the operation of that vehicle, then a claim under sec-
tion 19-103,192 although immunizing the officer from liability, would 
allow for recovery against the municipality based on ownership of 
the emergency vehicle. 193 Mter the municipality, the next foresee-
able defendant is the state government under the Maryland Tort 
186. See CONST. OF MD., DECL. RTS., art. IV, § 44 (providing that the sheriff shall 
"exercise such powers and perform such duties as now are or may hereafter 
be fIxed by law"). According to the court of appeals, "the ... Constitution, 
which mentions the office, and provides for fIlling it, does not specify or de-
scribe the powers or duties of the sheriff. These are left to the common law 
and the acts of the assembly." Beasly v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 655, 52 A. 61, 64 
(1902) (quoting Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376,488 (1860». 
187. See Prince George's County, Md. v. Aluisi, 354 Md. 422, 439, 731 A.2d 888, 895 
(1999); Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 281, 558 A.2d 399, 402 
(1989), superseded l7y statute as stated in, State v. Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 656 
A.2d 400 (1995). 
188. See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 572-73, 594 A.2d 121, 128 (1991); if. Ritchie v. 
Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 357, 597 A.2d 432, 438 (1991) (explaining that "while, 
under Maryland law, a sheriff is a state official, the ... classifIcation is not dis-
positive for purposes of § 1983" of the Civil Rights Act). 
189. See supra Part lILA. 
190. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 572-73, 594 A.2d at 128. 
191. See id. at 575-76, 594 A.2d at 130. It is important to note that local govern-
ments have waived their immunity from torts committed by their employees 
in a statutory enactment similar to the Maryland Torts Claim Act. See MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. §§ 5-301 to 5-304 (1998) (containing the provi-
sions of the Local Government Tort Claims Act). 
192. See supra Part III.B. 
193. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 19-103(c)(I) (1999). 
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Claims Act. 194 
Regardless of whether the officer is protected by public official 
immunity for discretionary acts, if the officer acted negligently and 
if the officer is a government employee, the state government can 
be liable because it has waived its immunity under the Maryland 
Torts Claims ACt. 195 Strategy is important if an argument is made 
that the officer's actions were grossly negligent, then the limited 
waiver of state immunity granted under the statute will be forever 
lost. 196 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis 
limits the attractiveness of the Fourteenth Amendment as a poten-
tial avenue of recovery for injuries sustained as a result of a high-
speed chase. 197 The result in Lewis suggests that only state legislative 
and political processes can provide a more conducive remedy for in-
jured citizens at the state level. l98 
To a limited extent, the Maryland Tort Claims Act provides the 
middle ground between competing policy goals protecting an of-
ficer with immunity for simple negligence, while waiving the state's 
sovereign immunity.l99 The Maryland General Assembly has the dis-
cretion to lower the bar and provide less police immunity depend-
ing on local community needs.2°O A proper exercise of this discre-
194. See supra Part IVA 
195. See James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 329-32, 418 A.2d 1173, 1181-
82 (1980). 
196. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE 
Gov'T § 12-104(b) (1999). Section 12-104(b) states that immunity is not 
waived in those instances described in section 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article. See id. Section 5-522(a) in pertinent part provides: 
"Immunity of the state is not waived under section 12-104 of the State Govern-
ment Article for: ... (4) [a]ny tortious act or omission of State personnel 
that: (i) [i]s not within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel; 
or (ii) [i]s made with malice or gross negligence." MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & 
JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (1998). 
197. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
198. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
199. See discussion supra Part IlIA. 
200. See discussion supra Part III. In the 1998 session, the Maryland Legislature 
adopted changes to the penalty for fleeing or eluding a police officer. See 
1998 Md. Laws 649. These changes increase the fine from $3,000 to $5,000 in 
the case of bodily injury to another, and raise the maximum penalty if a 
death occurs from 5 years of imprisonment to 10 years. See MD. CODE ANN., 
TRANSP. II § 27-101 (p) (2)-(3) (1999). Perhaps an even harsher penalty will 
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tion will strive to reach equipose between the competing interests of 
the pro-police and those who advocate greater protection for the 
public.201 
Roger K Picker 
make an offender think twice before fleeing from the police. 
201. See supra Part I.B. 
